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The purpose of this paper is to analyze Tolkien’s and Heidegger’s thoughts on technology 
with the aim of justifying that the metaphysical/ontological position of the second brings 
problems regarding the solution of the problem concerning technology that can be easily 
solved if one opts for a Tolkienian approach to the problem, that is, from a rather mundane or 
everyday dimension of humanity (or “hobbitry”, to be more precise). 
Tolkien, Heidegger, technology 
El presente trabajo tiene por finalidad analizar las reflexiones vertidas tanto por J.R.R. Tolkien 
como por Martin Heidegger sobre la técnica con el objetivo de justificar que la posición 
metafísica/ontológica del segundo trae problemas en lo que se refiere a la superación del 
problema de la técnica que pueden ser fácilmente superados si uno opta por una aproximación 
Tolkieniana al problema, es decir, desde una dimensión más bien mundana o cotidiana de la 
humanidad (o “hobbitidad”, para ser más precisos). 
Tolkien, Heidegger, tecnología 
 
Philosophy and literature. Is there a connection between these two topics? Though 
this is a question that justifies a rather large study, for the purposes of this essay we 
will make ours the statement that due to their malleability they cannot be treated as 
two altogether differentiable domains.1  
Literature, then, (or at least some of it) may allow us to understand the 
underlying philosophical thought that prevails in a certain time and place. As Hans-
Georg Gadamer says, art (in which we include literature) “is temporal in a more 
radical sense than everything that belongs to history”.2 Even though Gadamer is 
talking about the aesthetical experience and how in it we may see in a more adequate 
way the disclosure of being, his statement about historicity may also be applied to the 
work of art itself: in it the artist, conscious or unconsciously,3 captures a particular 
way of revealing the world that is characteristic of an era. Having this in mind, we 
have that different artistic and philosophical expressions from a same time may be 
manifesting (or even are inevitably manifesting) the same way of interpreting the 
world, of how the unveiling of being is operating, but in a different manner. So, in 
order to get a complete picture of it one should not prefer one over the other, but 
rather try to find the relation between both and see how each one of them provides a 
piece to assemble this epochal puzzle. 
Now, a phenomenon that was relevant in the twentieth century (and 
continues to be to this day) is the one concerning technology. This not only because 
of the advances and moral dilemma that it brought on, but also because of the 
“metaphysical-scientific way of looking at the world that […], in fact, «has» made 
unavoidable the alienated, unhoused, recurrently barbaric estate of modern 
technological and mass-consumption man”.4 Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was one 
of the first thinkers to give thought to this topic. Although in Being and Time (1927) 
a preamble to this subject may be found, is since the beginning of the thirties that 
technology occupies an important place on his thought.5 However, he was not the 
only one. John Ronald Reuel Tolkien (1892-1973) was another thinker to whom the 
question concerning technology was essential, though “the specific treatment of […] 
«it» in his works has not been fully appreciated”.6  
A question, then, rises: is it possible to complement their thoughts to get a 
more complete picture of this topic? To try to answer this we will briefly review 
Heidegger’s (1) and Tolkien’s (2) thoughts concerning technology; attempt to show 
how both of them, based on completely different grounds, managed to place 
themselves above the prevailing technological thinking of their (and our) time and 
foresee its catastrophic consequences (3); and, finally, analyse the solutions that can 
be drawn from reading and comparing both authors (4). 
 
 
“Technology is a way of revealing”.7 That is what Heidegger says in his work 
entitled The Question Concerning Technology (1954). But, what does he mean by 
this? To understand its significance, first we must have in consideration the 
following: first, Heidegger distinguishes the being of entities or beings (as they 
appear in certain historical time) from being as such.8 On this matter, he says that 
what should have been the fundamental question of the metaphysicians, that is, the 
question about the meaning of being, was actually never made. Second, he historizes 
the question of being, that is, he points out that the history of being, which is history 
in a more fundamental sense and not mere historiography, is the most faithful and 
profound record of the meaning of an era. Thus, whatever epochal events one seeks 
to explain, whether they belong to the realm of politics, art or natural sciences, they 
cannot escape the essential determinations of this history.9 And last, Heidegger “is 
centrally concerned with the relation between man and being, with man as the 
openness to which and in which being presences and is known”10 throughout the 
history of metaphysics.  
How, then, has Western metaphysics approached to the question of being? 
Heidegger tells us that due to the scientific tradition that has dominated reasoning in 
Western history from Plato and Aristotle, which arose not from a real perception of 
being, but from taking-for-granted the central existential mystery, this question has 
been forgotten.11 Thus, a “predominance of beings over against being”12 has been 
stated. 
Now, in Friedrich Nietzsche, whom Heidegger considers to be the last 
metaphysician of the Western tradition, the scholar from Freiburg tells us that this 
oblivion of being is taken to “the extreme of metaphysical thinking”.13 This because 
his “thought of will to power thinks beings as a whole such that the metaphysical 
ground of the history of the present and future age becomes visible and at the same 
time determinative”.14 Due to the specific purpose of this essay, an elaborate and 
detailed analysis of this topic will not be made. Nonetheless, Heidegger’s reading 
concerning truth in Nietzsche’s thought needs to be mentioned:  Heidegger focuses 
on Nietzsche’s statement that “truth must exist, but what is true about this truth does 
not need to be «true»”15 and explains it the following way: men need truth. However, 
there is not a pre-existing reality to which men have to conform. This need is rather 
a biological urge inherent to human beings. Thus, truth is not something objective 
and transcendent that men must seek outside. Truth is merely an estimate of value, a 
mere point of view that was able to prevail over others. So, what is true in life is not 
extrinsically determined by some supernatural realm, something fixed or crystallized; 
it is we, from inside, who beforehand regulate and establish this horizon of what 
needs to be truth in chaos. Truth, then, is revealed not as re-presenting [Vor-stellen], 
but as re-presenting [Vor-stellen];16 in it we find an inventive nature of reason which 
 
puts a horizon within a perspective (hence the emphasis on presenting). “The world 
arises from life-activity of what is alive and is only what and how it arises”.17 Now, 
since the different horizons that may be fixed in chaos never run out, an inevitable 
conclusion arises: there is no real world; everything is apparent. The distinction 
between the real and the apparent world has disappeared. 
By now, the reader must be thinking, why was there a need to bring this up? 
Why are we talking about truth and appearance? Wasn’t this essay about technology? 
Well, to talk about Nietzsche’s concept of truth was necessary because technology, 
or more precisely the concept of technology that we actually have, is, according to 
Heidegger, a necessary consequence of the self-imposed horizon of the oblivion of 
being that our inventive reason has fixed upon chaos. Now, even though this decision 
comes from Plato, it is in the rational and scientific foundations of Descartes where 
we find an important precursory of the current concept of technology. This because, 
as Steiner points out, “for Descartes, truth is determined and validated by certainty. 
Certainty, in turn, is located in the ego. The self becomes the hub of reality and relates 
to the world outside itself in an exploratory, necessarily exploitative way. As knower 
and user, the ego is predator”.18 In other words, the estimation of value that man has 
imposed upon chaos is that he is the centre of existence and that all that surrounds 
him matters only if he fixes on it some value that is useful to him. Nature is a mess 
that he has to order according to his own utility. Francisco Soler explains it in a very 
clear way when he says that “from Descartes […] modern man began to walk the 
path towards mastering all there is: he imposes his terms to reality —chaos—, 
dominates, crushes, exploits, pulverizes, transforms, accumulates, distributes; in sum 
produces, fabricates the world”.19  
Clearer should now be getting, then, why technology is a way of revealing. 
The current concept of technology is consequence of the way man, throughout the 
history of metaphysics, has revealed being (or more precisely forgotten it). “It is 
precisely technology the phenomenon that expresses in the plane of the way of being 
of man in the world, the unfolding and fulfilment of metaphysics”. 20 
Modern Age “is indeed an age of «improved means to deteriorated ends». It 
is a part of the essential malady of such days – producing the desire to escape, not 
indeed from life, but from our present time and self-made misery – that we are acutely 
conscious both of the ugliness of our works, and of their evil”.22 That is what John 
Ronald Reuel Tolkien tells us in his essay On Fairy Stories (1939). Clear is, then, 
that his vision of modern times is not a happy one. As Harrington points out, Tolkien 
had “no patience with the Twentieth Century-with its speed, with its filth and with its 
destructive potential, both physical and spiritual”.23 However, it is not his obscure 
 
 
vision of modernity, which can be found in many authors, that surprises us, but rather 
what he thinks is the cause of it. The origin of this evil may not be found outside; it 
does not come from an external entity. It is us, humanity, that, through our creations, 
have given life to this misery and self-imposed it in our lives. There is no other to 
whom we may attribute responsibility; we are the ones that seek these deteriorated 
ends.   
Now, one of Tolkiens most relevant intellectual discomfort with modernity 
is the relation between man and technology. In his essay On Fairy Stories he states it 
quite clearly when he says that,  
not long ago – incredibly though it may seem – I heard a clerk of Oxford declare that 
he «welcomed» the proximity of mass-production robot factories, and the roar of self-
obstructive mechanical traffic, because it brought his university into «contact with real 
life». […] The expression «real life» in this context seems to fall short of academic 
standards. The notion that motor-cars are more «alive» than, say, centaurs or dragons 
is curious; that they are more «real» than, say, horses is pathetically absurd. How real, 
how startlingly alive is a factory chimney compared with an elm tree: poor obsolete 
thing, insubstantial dream of an escapist!24 
What we can get from this is that underlying these words there is a cry for 
help for man’s alienation in what is inessential in existence. We have forgotten what 
is real and true, and left the world adrift. Now, though in his non-literary work we 
may find many similar references to technology, it is in his novels where subtly and 
in a more profound way this matter unfolds. Tolkien’s antipathy “to modern industrial 
society can surprise no one who has so much glanced at The Lord of the Rings”.25 As 
all ought to know, this is the story of how a hobbit named Frodo departs from The 
Shire, his home town, towards Mordor, to destroy Sauron’s one ring, which he got 
from his uncle Bilbo, to save Middle-Earth. This few words, as the reader certainly 
has noticed, do not make justice to what The Lord of the Rings really is; but they do 
give us a queue to analyse some parts of its storyline that are related to the matter that 
concerns us. Now, with this preliminary description in place, we will turn the analysis 
toward two characters: Tom Bombadil and Treebeard. 
The first one we meet in The Fellowship of the Ring. Who Tom Bombadil 
really is and where he comes from is not very clear. All we know is that he has been 
around Middle-Earth since the beginning of times (even before the Valar arrived) and 
that he seems to have a special connection with nature. In the novel he is the one who 
saves Merry, Pippin, Frodo and Sam from the Old Willow Man in The Old Forest. 
After this has been done, he invites them over to stay with him and his wife Goldberry 
in his house for a few days; it is here, in a dialogue between Frodo and Tom 
Bombadil’s wife, where we are able to have a glance at Tolkien’s view concerning 
the relation between man and nature. Frodo asks Goldberry whether “all this strange 
land belongs to him [Tom Bombadil]?”, to what she answers: “No indeed! […] That 
 
would indeed be a burden, […] The trees and the grasses and all things growing or 
living in the land belong each to themselves”.26 Though at first sight this dialogue 
seems to be insignificant, we can gather much of Tolkien’s thought from it. For him 
nature is not something that man owns. It has its own being that must be respected. 
In other words, land (and the beings that inhabit it) does not belong to humanity; it 
belongs to itself. It is wrong for mankind to attribute lordship over nature and 
determine its ends. This goes against their own being and trees know it. Tolkien 
expresses this, though in a very subtle way, when he points out that “Tom’s words 
laid bare the hearts of trees and their thoughts, which were often dark and strange, 
and filled with hatred of things that go free upon the earth, gnawing, biting, breaking, 
hacking, burning: destroyers and usurpers”.27 In other words, because they belong to 
themselves, they hate and suffer with creatures that destroy them for their own 
purposes without considering that they are living things.  
Now, though it may seem that Tolkien is merely criticizing how we treat 
nature, his thoughts are actually a clear reflection of his own personality. As Braulio 
Fernandez Biggs indicates, “known is Tolkien’s devoted love towards tress […]. He 
admired them, «talked» to them and suffered every cut and pruning”.28 Having this 
in consideration, it is not strange that our next character to be analysed is actually a 
tree. We are talking about Treebeard. Though he is not in fact a tree, he belongs to a 
“tree-ish” species called Ents. They are the shepherds of the forest, and, as we are 
told in The Silmarillion,29 are in charge of protecting all trees and plants. In Ents we 
may see in a more direct way some of Tolkien’s thought concerning technology.  This 
because, as he himself says, “Ents are composed of philology, literature, and life”.30 
Returning to the novel, we meet Treebeard in The Two Towers in the forest of 
Fangorn when Merry and Pippin are escaping from Grishnákh, one of Saruman’s 
orcs. After the hobbits tell him some of the adventures they’ve been on, they arrive 
to the topic of Saruman, the white wizard. About him Treebeard says that “He 
[Saruman] has a mind of metal and wheels; and he does not care for growing things, 
except as far as they serve him for the moment”.31 The topic of technology here is 
clear. Saruman has the mind of a machine and thus does not care for other things (in 
this case trees and plants) unless he gets some profit from them. Things that surround 
him do not matter for themselves; the wizard is the one that determines if they are 
worth or not. But what bothers Treebeard the most is “the orc-work, the wanton 
hewing – rárum – without even the bad excuse of feeding the fires”.32 That is, the 
destruction of nature for no apparent reason, for the mere desire of destruction, for 
assuming a superiority over the rest of the world that enables creatures to do what 
they want with it, even if it is not useful for anyone. It is not strange, then, that Ents 
end up marching to war singing “To Isengard with doom we come! With doom we 
come, with doom we come!”.33 
 
 
Now, though this few passages of The Lord of the Rings do not cover all of 
the authors concerns about man, nature and technology, they do leave us with a 
thought: underlying Tolkien’s narrative lies a severe critique towards the idea that 
man has certain privileges over the surrounding world that enables him to do as he 
wishes with it, to impose his own standards, to order it without any consideration that 
is not his own, even if this means destroying it.  
“Our time is at hand: the world of Men, which we must rule. But we must 
have power, power to order all things as we will, for that good which only the Wise 
can see”.34 That is what Saruman tells Gandalf when they are talking in Orthanc. 
Now, doesn’t this seem similar to Heidegger’s position of the self-imposed need of 
man for ordering reality according to his own will? Doesn’t Saruman’s claim remind 
us of his critique to Descartes cogito ergo sum and the arrogance of rationalism? And, 
does Tom Bombadil’s and Treebeard’s anger based on man’s taking-for-granted 
nature based on his belief that reality is solely determined from him differ much from 
Heidegger’s claim that “the power concealed in modern technology determines the 
relation of man to that which exists”35 and thus “nature becomes a gigantic gasoline 
station, an energy source for modern technology and industry”?36 It seems they are 
actually talking about the same thing but approach it in a different manner. 
Heidegger’s critique towards modern technology is based on metaphysical grounds, 
on a misconception and forgetfulness of what being really is. Tolkien, on the other 
hand, thinks that the problem can be found in how man embraces the otherness of 
nature, on his belief of superiority over the surrounding world, in the fact that he has 
forgotten that all things belong to themselves. But in the end, their intellectual 
discomfort is the same: man’s belief that he is the centre of existence and how, based 
on this misconception, he relates to the world.  
Now, after bringing forward both of these authors view on nature and 
technology, we ask ourselves, why did they criticize technology? Was it merely 
because they were more comfortable with country life? Or did they actually see that 
terrible consequences arose from modern calculative thought? For Heidegger, the 
oblivion of being and its consequential mechanical thought is not something that is 
important merely for the theoretical field. Actually, he is of the opinion that the 
metaphysical decision of what is and is not being for an epoch affects the whole of 
reality. In the Middle Ages, for example, a being itself carried the form and men, in 
the act of knowing, were mere receptacles of it. That is, things existed for themselves 
and man was a mere spectator. In modern times, however, man only receives raw 
data, chaos, and he is the one that orders it and gives the form. Thus, things need a 
certain activity from man to come to existence. Man, in a sense, makes reality. For 
Tolkien, on the other hand, man has a “huge capacity to mold not only himself, but 
 
also the environment”;37 so, how he relates to things that surround him is not a minor 
thing. Though, as Christian, the creator of Middle-Earth does believe that there are 
natural things that are determined by God and are immutable, he is also of the idea 
that man, throughout his conception of the otherness and his relation with it, is able 
to shape the world in a certain way. In his own words, “a man is both a seed and in 
some degree also a gardener, for good or ill”.38 Having this in consideration, we may 
conclude that for both of these authors any phenomena we seek to explain, whether 
they belong to the realm of humanities, arts or natural sciences, cannot escape from 
the modern mechanical determination that man has imposed over reality. Even 
politics get dragged and subsumed under this technological view. But, why politics? 
Well, as Marcos García de la Huerta indicates, “if anything may define the condition 
of political being is precisely «being in the world», which is a sort of an a priori to 
politics. There is no «politicity» without «being with others» in a virtually common 
world”.39And how has been (and still is) our being in the world? To use Heidegger’s 
words, mechanized, and that means violent and thoughtless. Violent, because we 
haven’t established a harmonic existence with the otherness, with the surrounding 
world. Thoughtless, because we haven’t realized that in proceeding like this, we are 
actually destroying ourselves. Indeed, we have the notion that what surrounds us is 
something we must confront and impose our own will, and the consequences of this 
have not been positive. Deforestation of the planet and tropical jungles, pollution of 
air and water, extinction of numerous animal species and global are only of them. 
But, why do we proceed like this? Why don’t we stop? It is surprising that it is in 
Tolkien’s Melkor40 where we find the answer. He tells us that this character “sought 
[…] to increase the power and glory of the part assigned to him”41 and that, because 
of his “arrogance to contempt for all things save himself, […] he turned to subtlety 
in perverting to his own will all that he would use”.42 The correlation is uncanny and 
it seems that it is no coincidence, the problem is our ego that seeks to dominate. 
What is worst is that we haven’t realized that this self-centred conception of 
man does not only have harmful consequences for the environment, but also for 
ourselves. We not only defy nature with our desire to rule, but also the rest of 
humanity. Both of our authors know this, and their insights on the atomic bomb 
confirms it. Tolkien, on a letter written in 1945 to his son Christopher, says that “such 
explosives in men's hands, while their moral and intellectual status is declining, is 
about as useful as giving out firearms to all inmates of a gaol and then saying that 
you hope «this will ensure peace»”.43 Therefore, our lack of concern for including 
wisdom and considering moral principles in technological advances has led us to 
something like the Hobbesian state of nature, where man is a wolf to man. No one is 
safe and it is our own existence the one that is in danger. Heidegger has the same 
thought, but he says that is not the bomb, nor the men who created it the ones to 
blame. For him this weapon of mass destruction is natural consequence of the 
oblivion of being. He tells us that “man stares at what the explosion of the atom bomb 
 
 
could bring with it. He does not see that the atom bomb and its explosion are the mere 
final emission of what has long since taken place”.44 In other words, if it wasn’t the 
atomic bomb, it would be another machinery the one that threatens our own existence. 
The problem is us. 
In a few words, our narcissistic view of what our status in existence has 
serious practical consequences that should not be taken lightly. Wars for energy 
sources, walls for preventing immigration, the prevalence of economic interest over 
humanity and the belief that wealth is the solution to every problem reflect this very 
clearly. Nonetheless, as Gandalf says, we should not despair “for despair is only for 
those who see the end beyond all doubt. We do not”.45 
After this analysis, the reader is probably asking him or herself the following: 
are these authors saying that we should go back to a pre-mechanical life style and 
throw away all technological advances that have been accomplished by man? And, if 
this is not the case, are we doomed to live in this technical horizon that we have 
established for ourselves?  
The answer to the first question is clearly no; none of these authors are naïve 
enough to believe that in order to overcome man’s alienation in technology we must 
return to the age of the cavemen. In the case of Heidegger, to understand his critique 
towards machination that way would be to misinterpret his thought.46 In his own 
words, “it would be shortsighted to condemn it [technology] as the work of the devil. 
We depend on technical devices; they even challenge us to ever greater advances”.47 
Technological advances, then, are not themselves the cause of modern man’s “loss 
of direction”. There is nothing wrong with using technology for our own advantage. 
The problem, as Tolkien points out, is to use this “devices (apparatus) instead of […] 
«developing» the inherent inner powers or talents — or even the use of these talents 
with the corrupted motive of dominating: bulldozing the real world, or coercing other 
wills”.48 The issue, then, are the purposes for which we use technical knowledge and 
how we relate to the devices we create.  
Now, and returning to our second question, if destroying all cars, iPhones 
and iPads is not the solution, is there a way out? For Heidegger there is. He tells us 
that 
we can act otherwise. We can use technical devices, and yet with proper use also keep 
ourselves so free of them, that we may let go of them any time. We can use technical 
devices as they ought to be used, and also let them alone as something which does not 
affect our inner and real core. We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, 
 
and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay our 
nature.49 
His call, then, is to overcome modern vision of technical objects, to regain 
their essence and, throughout this, win back our independence from mechanical 
devices. However, there is a catch. As Steiner points out, this call is the same as the 
one to overcome Western metaphysics “precisely because exploitative technology 
and the worship of allegedly objective science are the natural culmination of Western 
metaphysics after Plato”.50 This detachment from technological devices, then, 
couldn’t possibly be the way to overcome modern man’s technological alienation. If 
the question concerning technology and the overcoming of Western metaphysics are 
the same, we have that such an enterprise does not depend on particular individuals. 
In on other words, there is nothing in our daily lives that we can do to go past the 
metaphysical decision of forgetfulness of the being, and the detachment from 
technological devices, though useful for us, would make sense only as an emotional 
tone that we should have while waiting for this major metaphysical decision to occur, 
nothing more. As the king Theoden says when talking about the paths of the dead, 
“the way is shut”.51 
We have arrived at a dead end; we are trapped in a technological way of 
interpreting the world. However, it is precisely here where the question we made at 
the beginning of this essay becomes decisive: can the literary works of Tolkien add 
something to Heidegger’s thought? Fortunately, the answer seems to be positive. 
Though both authors seem to share this dark vision concerning modern man and our 
conception of nature and technology, we have that “underlying Tolkien’s sometimes 
dark technological narratives lies a persistent hope that cultures and peoples, once 
fallen, can still hope to re-order their sub-creation to conform to their creator”.52 
Isengard falls, Ents defeat Saruman and Frodo, with a little help from Gollum, 
destroys the Ring. Darkness, or at least most of it, is banished from Middle-Earth. 
But, how was this accomplished? Did some powerful being through organized 
political tactics and war strategies or merely by his own power manage to impose his 
will over his enemies? Was there a metaphysical decision of reversing the oblivion 
of being? The answer to all of these questions is no. On the contrary, this heroic deed 
was done by a small and simple creature: a hobbit from The Shire. Now, though the 
story of Frodo and the Ring is a real treasure in terms of fiction, the extent of its value 
does not end there. This mainly because, as Fernandez Biggs points out, for Tolkien 
“literature should provide a way out, be a road towards recovery”.53 That way, the 
final victory of the fellowship of the Ring means only one thing: hope for our world. 
Hope that, throughout small decisions in our daily lives, the mechanical and 
technological way of representing the world will be defeated and better times will 
come. Hope that we, simple and apparently unimportant man and women, can 
 
 
actually create a better world. Change is possible, we must only dare to take the first 
step. As Tolkien say to W.H. Auden in one of his letters: 
Most men make some journeys. Whether long or short, with an errand or simply to go 
«there and back again», is not of primary importance. As I tried to express it in Bilbo's 
Walking Song, even an afternoon-to-evening walk may have important effects. When 
Sam had got no further than the Woody End he had already had an «eye-opener». For 
if there is anything in a journey of any length, for me it is this: a deliverance from the 
plantlike state of helpless passive sufferer, an exercise however small of will, and 
mobility – and of curiosity, without which a rational mind becomes stultified.54 
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